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“A Mob of Women” Confront  
Post–Colonial Republican Politics
How Class, Race, and Partisan Ideology Affected  
Gendered Political Space in Nineteenth–Century  
Southwestern Colombia
James E. Sanders
This essay explores why some groups of women in nineteenth–century 
Colombia were able to engage in public, political action but others 
were not. Elite conservative women (mostly white) and popular liberal 
women (mostly black and mulatta) found ways to participate publicly 
in republican politics, but elite liberal women (mostly white) and some 
popular conservative women (mostly Indian) were largely absent from 
the public sphere. I argue that colonial gender roles, elite and popular 
visions of citizenship, the contest between the Liberal and Conservative 
Parties, the structure of indigenous communities, and popular liberal 
women’s access to independent economic resources all helped shape 
women’s abilities to publicly practice republican politics. Instead of 
asserting that the rise of republicanism in nineteenth–century Latin 
America reduced women’s political space, I propose that race, class, and 
partisan ideologies acted in complex and locally determined ways to both 
create male political subjects and open or close possibilities for women 
to forge political discourses and practices for themselves.
In the southwestern Colombian city of Pasto, women representing the Con-servative Party sprung a nasty surprise on the police commissioner who 
had planned to read publicly the new Liberal constitution on 1 September 
1853. Instead of finding a welcoming throng to celebrate the nation’s new 
governing document, as the commissioner and his veteran force of national 
guardsmen marched through the streets a “mob of women” confronted them 
with a volley of “insults, sarcasm, water, and stones.”1 The commissioner 
was a Liberal, and his new constitution, which guaranteed unrestricted 
adult male citizenship for the first time in Colombia, was a product of the 
Liberal triumph over Conservatives in the past elections and civil war.2 
Wealthy, white male conservatives detested the new constitution’s assertion 
of equality, under which no titles of birth, nobility, privilege, or class would 
be recognized, and worried as well over liberals’ perceived anticlericalism.3 
Pasto was very conservative, and the city’s elites, ever proud of their heri-
tage and social station, did not appreciate these appointed Liberal officials’ 
political theatre; however, any disruption of the constitutional ceremony by 
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conservative men would no doubt have been answered with arrest or force. 
Elite conservative women seized the public, political sphere in their stead, 
and if the protestors failed to stop the reading of the Liberals’ constitution 
by throwing insults, water, and rocks, they at least, literally, put a damper 
on the festivities. 
A few years earlier, women of a very different social position had also 
stormed into the public sphere a few hundred kilometers north in the town 
of Cali. On several different nights from 1848 to 1851, poor Afro–Colombian 
and mestiza women and men entered the city’s commons (called ejidos) 
to destroy fences that hacendados (landowners) had erected in an effort to 
claim the land as their own private property.4 The commons were one of 
the few resources that women, especially women who headed their own 
households, could exploit. Some families had small houses and garden plots 
on the ejidos; many more (over a thousand by one estimate) used the land to 
pasture their milk cows and other livestock or to cut firewood further up the 
mountainous slopes, selling the charcoal in the city for what little subsistence 
it provided. Without these resources, one observer noted that the “unhappy 
women wood gatherers” would become beggars and be forced to watch 
their children starve. “Driven by the pang of hunger and their conscience 
calmed by the tears of their children demanding sustenance,” the women 
entered the commons and with “iron and fire” destroyed the new fences, re-
claiming the fields for their families from the hacendados.5 The poor men who 
participated in these raids had recently become popular allies to the Liberal 
Party (whose elite members justified the fence destruction), supporting the 
party as soldiers in the civil war against political conservatives that broke 
out in 1851.6 The women associated with these poor, liberal men as wives, 
lovers, sisters, mothers, daughters, fellow workers, and neighbors, whom 
I call popular liberal women, were not recognized as allies by elite liberals, 
but they still acted in concert with popular liberal men and would do so in 
the future to support the Liberal Party. The women were so different from 
their counterparts in Pasto—black, mulatta, and mestiza instead of white, 
and poor instead of rich—nevertheless, both popular liberal women and 
elite conservative women found ways to participate publicly in Colombia’s 
post–colonial republican politics. Not all women found such ways to enter 
the public sphere. In contrast to elite conservatives and popular liberals, 
elite liberal women and many popular conservative women generally were 
excluded from politics and public voice.7 
The general consensus among historians of gender is that indepen-
dence from Spain and the emergence of republicanism did little to increase 
Latin American women’s status, political rights, or presence in the public 
sphere during most of the nineteenth century, in some ways similar to Linda 
Kerber’s analysis of the American Revolution and early U.S. Republic.8 The 
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breaking of the colonial order signified no disruption in the patriarchal 
family/political relationship; if anything, postcolonial republicanism may 
have decreased women’s roles in society and politics. Sarah Chambers 
has argued that independence and liberal republicanism actually reduced 
women’s access to the public sphere, as public opinion was now the result 
of rational debate by male citizens, with women’s former colonial role in 
forming opinion now denigrated as mere gossip.9 Elizabeth Dore entitled 
her essay on women and the nineteenth century “One Step Forward, Two 
Steps Back.”10 Most would agree with theorists of French history that the 
exclusion of women from the republican public sphere “was not incidental 
but central to its incarnation.”11 Yet did all women experience post–colonial 
republicanism the same way? May we assume that gender alone determined 
women’s public and political lives? I will argue that the race, class, and party 
orientation of women vastly affected their experience of republican politics 
as well as their access to or exclusion from the public sphere.12 Beyond the 
more frequently studied courtroom where family dramas played out for 
those of all classes, some, but not all, women were able to engage directly 
in political activity that men assumed they had reserved for themselves. 
Of course, politics ranged much beyond the public sphere; however, for 
this article, I wish to concentrate on public, political actions that were 
recognized as such in the nineteenth century, actions explicitly directed 
toward influencing the state or larger society beyond the family or com-
munity level (which while vitally important, and certainly “political,” are 
of a different nature than public action).13 Elite conservative women (mostly 
white and well-to-do) and popular liberal women (mostly black, mulatta, 
or mestiza and poor) had the most presence in southwestern Colombia’s 
public, political world, although for vastly different reasons. Meanwhile, 
elite liberal women (mostly white and well-to-do) and popular conservative 
indigenous women (mostly poor) found little space, again due to strikingly 
distinct reasons. 
Elite Women
Since I argue that political affiliation was key to understanding vari-
ances in women’s ability to practice politics, this study will focus on the 
second half of the nineteenth century, after the Liberal and Conservative 
Parties emerged in Colombia.14 The parties competed for power via elections 
in a republican political system that was also punctuated by numerous civil 
wars (1851, 1854, 1860–1863, 1876–1877, 1879, and 1885). In southwestern 
Colombia, conservatives had long controlled both the institutions of power 
and the region’s economic base of plantations, haciendas, and some mining. 
While liberals tended to be less well–established economically and socially, 
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many were professionals and artisans, and some liberal families were quite 
powerful and wealthy. The parties agreed philosophically on many issues, 
but differed sharply on the role of the Catholic Church in public life, the 
importance of maintaining strict social control over the poor, slavery, the 
meanings of citizenship, and, most importantly, who would be citizens in 
the new republic.15 During this period, it is elite women with affinity for 
the Conservative Party who most appear in the archive as political actors 
in the Cauca region (the southwest of Colombia).16 
One way wealthy conservative women could enter the public sphere 
in the republican era was by using their traditional public roles from the 
colonial period concerning charity and religion, which their powerful 
families dominated. Elite conservative women led charitable efforts in the 
region, distributing food and clothing to the needy, usually tightly linked 
with religious ceremonies, and founding schools for girls.17 Conservative 
men approved of women’s work in charity, as they believed such work, 
tied to religion, helped the poor accept their place in society.18 Conservative 
women also saw the founding of schools as a political act. In the run–up 
to the 1876–1877 civil war, the conservative women of the Society of the 
Sacred Heart of Jesus helped found religious schools for girls, so the children 
would not have to attend secular state schools (secular schooling being one 
of the sparks that started the war). The society also provided charity to the 
needy, through their Hospital de Caridad.19 While the Conservative Party 
controlled the national state in 1858, some of the most powerful women of 
Popayán wrote a petition requesting funds for a girls’ school, which would 
benefit “the civilization of woman and the cause of your compatriots.”20
The increasingly bitter divide between the Conservative and Liberal 
Parties over the role of the Church gave elite conservative women the most 
political space. Religion was a key definer of conservative and female iden-
tity, as expressed in a huge petition from Bogotá protesting attacks on the 
Church by the Liberal state, in which the female writers argued that religion 
defined the role of women.21 The Liberal Party’s assumption of power in 
1849, and its expulsion of the Jesuits from Colombia the next year gave elite 
conservative women a reason to act. Upon the announcement of the decree 
in Popayán, four women wrote a letter of protest concerning the Liberals’ 
action and expressed the city’s appreciation for the Jesuits; over a thousand 
people quickly signed. Religion allowed elite conservative women not just to 
enter the political sphere as followers of husbands or fathers, but also to lead 
their male relatives in action.22 The petitions, often stretching page after page, 
organized by elite conservative women protesting the Liberal government’s 
attacks on the Jesuits or church property attracted more signatories than any 
other type of petitions in the Cauca region.23 Wealthy mothers in Pasto also 
refused to allow their children to be baptized by liberal priests.24
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During the aforementioned 1876–1877 civil war, a war fought largely 
over religious issues, liberals had arrested a priest who was participating 
in the conservative rebellion and brought him to the state capital, Popayán 
(a traditionally conservative city nestled in the mountains). Almost im-
mediately, two crowds gathered in protest: one made up of the bishop 
and priests of the city, and the other composed of a large crowd of women 
and children. The women were “armed with revolvers, daggers, and even 
forks.” A Liberal official decried the “fanaticism” of the women, who hoped 
to incite the local militia into rebellion over the priest’s arrest. The soldiers, 
however, remained loyal and eventually dispersed both groups of protes-
tors. Liberals only saw the women’s actions as zealotry and contrasted the 
irrational action of the women with the steady response of the male militia, 
identified as “citizens.”25 Of course, the women were defending the Church, 
but they were also criticizing liberal policies as well as playing their own 
part in the civil war, if not as soldiers, then as demonstrators in support of 
their ideas and male relatives at war. Religion and charity, while seen as 
traditional, allowed elite conservative women to enter the novel realm of 
republican politics.
With men away fighting or unable to act due to wartime restrictions, 
periods of warfare especially allowed elite conservative women much public 
space.26 During the 1854 civil war, “the noble matrons and the fair sex in 
general of Cali” welcomed the conservative military force that retook the 
city from the liberals, offering them numerous supplies due to their “ar-
dent patriotism.”27 During the 1860–1863 civil war, María Jesús Barona, a 
member of one of Cali’s more powerful and wealthy conservative families, 
was accused of enticing liberal troops to desert by offering them clothing 
and money.28 When a rumor of conservative success in the same war spread 
north, a Liberal official had to arrest an elite conservative woman who “had 
started to buy rifles and ammunition” to support the war in Cartago.29 Other 
conservative women founded a military hospital.30 
Finally, elections would seem to be the political space most closed to 
women, as they were not citizens and could not vote regardless of their race 
or class. Yet elite conservative women were active campaigners for their 
party. Conservative men certainly assumed their female relations followed 
politics, since they used women’s interest in a candidate as a mark of his 
broad support.31 A liberal paper noted that some women “had sworn under 
oath to attend the primary elections of 1852 with their daggers, pointed and 
sharp, to kill any liberal who went to vote.”32 Conservative men approved 
of conservative women’s campaigning, noting the success these women 
were having in working towards the upcoming elections.33 
An even more important role these women played was in countering 
liberal efforts to mobilize the lower–class population in political clubs called 
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Democratic Societies. The Democratic Societies were a great liberal success, 
their poor members, many Afro–Colombian, becoming the backbone of 
the Liberal Party. In the early 1850s, conservative men were stunned by 
this turn of events, and seemed unsure how to act, as they had no desire to 
mobilize the poor, whom they believed should refrain from politics. It was 
conservative women who first began organizing societies for themselves 
to counter the Liberal Party’s successful Democratic Societies; the women’s 
example would be followed by elite conservative men, although the male 
societies seemed less active or threatening.34 This activity bothered liberals 
so much that the Liberal governor of the province apparently threatened 
to dissolve the women’s society.35 Conservative men were impressed with 
the women’s organizing, crediting the females’ society with forcing Pasto’s 
Democratic Society to stop meeting, although the archival record is unclear 
how they did this.36 As late as 1879 while conservatives prepared for yet 
another civil war to try to displace the dominant Liberal Party, it was not 
the men who organized themselves first into political clubs in small towns, 
but rather the women.37 The aim of the women was to found a school for 
girls, a profoundly political act with the debates over religious versus secu-
lar education raging that served as an organizing base for the civil war to 
come, as it had in the 1876–1877 war.
Elite conservative women used traditional roles as charitable provid-
ers, pious churchgoers, or social doyennes to enter republican politics. 
Conservative women socially enjoyed much power given the prestige of 
their families and used this position to snub Liberal officials by refusing to 
attend their dances.38 These women also created new roles for themselves 
by participating in elections, civil wars, and founding republican political 
clubs; therefore, we cannot only ascribe their success at entering the public 
sphere to their appropriation of colonial roles. Conservative women also 
managed to exert influence via new republican political institutions and 
processes.39 
The success of elite conservative women in entering the political realm 
stands in sharp contrast to elite liberal women, who only make sporadic 
appearances in the public record. Charity was less of an option, as conser-
vative families controlled most of the region’s charitable institutions. In 
one of very few recorded public appearances, “seven liberal ladies” placed 
garlands of flowers over the heads of the newly freed in a ceremony that 
celebrated the manumission of slaves (and linked that manumission to the 
Liberal Party).40 As we will see below, elite liberal women had as much in-
terest in politics as their conservative counterparts, yet they were unable to 
publicly act on their political ideas. To understand this curious discrepancy, 
we have to look at men’s gendered visions of politics as filtered through 
partisan ideology.
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In general, it seems conservative men were more comfortable than 
liberal men with women’s participation in the public sphere.41 Liberals 
vociferously attacked conservative women, mocking them as “old, ugly 
matrons” and claiming they were controlled by the Church.42 Liberals also 
claimed that women really did not support republicanism but secretly 
wanted monarchy, thus hoping to delegitimize their actions within a repub-
lican system.43 Liberals celebrated their own male popular liberals entering 
politics by joining the Democratic Societies, and they mocked conserva-
tives’ fear of the “equality” preached in the clubs. Yet these same liberals 
denigrated conservative efforts to form their own political club, called the 
“Society of Baby Jesus,” as their club was only made up of “noble and the 
most important” women.44
Liberals also lamented that women would be corrupted by entering 
politics. A liberal paper chastised conservatives for allowing women to 
enter political clubs, thereby “degrading them.”45 Another paper warned 
women to stay in their homes: “Your mission is the domestic life, the care 
of your husbands and children. Look, mothers [madres de familia] while 
you leave your homes to occupy yourselves in political conquests, perhaps 
your daughters, those delicate little flowers, will hear the voice of the se-
ducer.”46 Thus, women’s abandonment of the private sphere and their role 
as republican mothers would only lead to the sexual corruption of their 
charges. Worse, claimed liberals, since women would not be able to convince 
men through reason and argument, they would have to rely on money 
and feminine wiles to have success in the political sphere. This argument 
formed the core of the elite liberal position—women lacked rationality, 
therefore they could not be citizens, and thus they had no role in politics, 
especially partisan politics (as historian Melanie Gustafson has shown for 
the nineteenth–century United States, women’s entry in partisan politics 
was particularly worrisome).47 If they still sought a role, it would only lead 
to the corruption of their daughters, themselves, and politics as a whole, 
since women would have to rely on sex, instead of reason—an argument 
shared by republican societies across the Americas.48 
It is not that conservatives were automatically comfortable with the in-
creased role of women around mid–century, since it seemed part of a general 
opening of political roles to include the previously excluded, which conser-
vatives deplored. One conservative newspaper worried about the increasing 
politicization of society, particularly the entrance of the lower classes into 
the public sphere, which was also beginning to involve elite women: “Even 
the fair sex . . . from whose lips there should not pass anything but words 
of consolation, peace, and reconciliation, very recently, with few exceptions, 
has occupied itself in politics, so intensely, with such vehemence.” While 
this worried conservatives of “the strong sex” and while the paper aggres-
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sively condemned political action by popular liberal men, it nevertheless 
supported this novel and disquieting action by elite conservative women: 
“However, we do not want one to believe that we condemn the interest that 
many women take in encouraging a friend, a brother, a son, a husband to 
save their country.”49 Of course, the paper hoped to position this political 
action in the context of supporting patriarchal figures in women’s lives, 
yet conservative men’s view of women’s participation in politics sharply 
contrasted with that of liberal men.
Elite conservative men were not so tolerant of elite liberal women, for 
even if they made their presence felt less frequently on the public stage, 
they still took a fervent interest in politics. During the 1860–1863 civil war, 
a conservative paper chastised liberal women for supporting a party whose 
program promoted “the degradation of women, the persecution of the 
Catholic faith and the disrespect of Christian morals.” The paper described 
such liberal women as liable “to commit more crimes against society than 
the bandit” and “bastardizing their angelic mission of peace and charity,” 
with the result that they would eventually be abandoned by their friends 
and relatives to be alone in society.50 It is significant that the paper notes no 
action taken by these liberal women, save an intense interest in the news 
of the day. The paper described such women as desperate to hear the latest 
word on the civil war and able to recite verbatim the proclamations of their 
favorite politicians. Surely the paper would have eagerly reported if these 
liberal women had taken to the streets demonstrating or insulting conser-
vative men, yet the writer described no such action by these women. As 
vociferously as the paper denounced liberal women, it did not oppose all 
women in politics: “We do not censure the woman who adopts a political 
opinion that agrees with her sex, her heart and her mission. Thus, not only 
do we not condemn the conduct of conservative women, but, rather, we 
applaud it and celebrate it for its dignity and good judgment. In addition, 
if you think about it, conservative women have not embraced any politi-
cal party; they have not done more than follow their natural inclination of 
their makeup, defending what their sex has always defended, to wit, their 
religion, their honor, their dignity.”51 As in the nineteenth–century United 
States, men could celebrate women’s public activity as long as such activity 
was cast as fulfilling women’s natural roles.52
How could conservative women participate in politics and not liberal 
women? Religion and visions of citizenship are both key. Women had al-
ways had a public role in religious rituals and charity since colonial times. 
Conservative women had entered politics to defend the Church and the 
family, by protesting against the Liberal Party’s support of civil marriage—a 
challenge to the institution of matrimony that united religion and family 
life. As long as women were engaged in activities involving religion, char-
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ity, and the family, they could promote these traditional concerns in the 
nontraditional sphere of party politics.53 Of course, while conservative men 
recognized “conservative women” and supported and even celebrated their 
actions, in the quotes above we see how they hoped to classify such action 
as natural, as opposed to being political. Since conservatives controlled most 
charitable institutions, liberal women could not pursue that path to political 
involvement; since liberals sought to decrease the role of religion in society, 
liberal women could hardly use religion as a means to enter politics.
Perhaps even more important were conservatives’ and liberals’ visions 
of citizenship that determined who had a right and duty to practice politics. 
Liberal thought allowed political participation for all citizens. Poor men had 
already asserted that when they lacked legal citizenship (such as before the 
Constitution of 1853), they could seize effective citizenship through politi-
cal action, which liberals had to accept given their support for supposed 
universal citizenship. Political participation, therefore, made the citizen 
and not vice versa. This seemed to open the door to women, which liberals 
promptly tried to shut by excluding women from politics. Liberal schools 
regularly offered classes on “the rights and duties of citizens” to boys but 
only very rarely to girls.54 While the Liberal Party was in power, the new 
election code stipulated that any votes “given in favor of women” would 
be considered null and void, raising the question if there had been votes for 
women in previous elections.55 While liberals did seek to allow civil mar-
riage and divorce, this did not mean they were prepared to allow female 
citizenship or fundamentally alter male prerogatives as patriarchs.56 The 
liberals’ 1863 constitution not only formally excluded women from citizen-
ship, but also barred them from being “active members” of the state, thus 
removing them from the public sphere.57 Liberals could not allow women 
any political participation, as claiming political space would make them 
citizens; they justified this exclusion, as we saw above, by claiming women 
lacked rationality and independence.58
That the new republican politics broadened subaltern men’s role in 
public life was disconcerting enough. Women’s participation threatened 
the viability of the whole republican system in two ways. First, it made 
republicanism simply seem too frightening and strange. Second, by mak-
ing women equal, it removed them from the control of their husbands and 
fathers, thus eroding the base of the citizen as a padre de familia. Most male 
republicans feared disruption of the family, from which the male citizen 
sprang, and therefore, constructed their citizenship by excluding women.59 
Crimes of adultery and family abandonment were often punished with 
harsher penalties (prison, fines, and even exile), including loss of “political 
rights” for men, than were crimes of assault or robbery.60 Of course, men, at 
least at times, received less harsh punishments than women for adultery, 
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who could suffer public flogging.61 A congressional report on divorce noted 
that marriage was the difference between “civilization and barbarism.” 
For republican males, “domestic order [is the] fundamental base of public 
order.”62 Both liberals and conservatives at best saw women’s place as re-
publican mothers, educating future male citizens, which as other scholars 
have shown isolated women from the republican public sphere.63 We cannot 
underestimate how revolutionary the republican experiment was, but what 
made such innovation possible was the security of the family and that men 
would rule over women.
Conservative men had become comfortable with conservative women 
participating in politics, but only because their actions did not threaten to 
change the political system. By assuming that women’s actions were natural, 
men were able to reassure themselves that women were not seeking more 
political power, especially citizenship. Liberalism, however, only allowed 
citizens to participate in politics, so it had to exclude women unless it could 
accept them as equals (which did begin to happen later in the century). 
Conservatism, not quite so bound, saw room for certain forms of partici-
pation for all members of society. Since conservatives imagined society as 
inherently unequal, women could be allowed to participate in certain ways, 
as it in no way gave them a claim of equal standing with men. It was not 
that conservatives thought differently than liberals regarding women’s fit-
ness as citizens. It was simply that for them women’s political participation 
was not a claim on citizenship. For conservatives, citizenship was still an 
inherited, not an earned, right, and women’s actions at that time seemed 
not to pose a threat but rather to provide a valuable weapon against liberal 
power.64 Ironically, liberals’ more expansive vision of citizenship, which 
could include illiterate ex–slave tenant farmers, could not accept any public 
political action by women. 
Popular Women
If elite male liberals’ conception of citizenship and religion excluded 
wealthy, white liberal women, how then did poor, black, mulatta, and 
mestiza popular liberal women manage to enter the public sphere? They 
mostly did so through a political repertoire of direct actions in the suppos-
edly male–dominated “street,” including participation in demonstrations 
or riots, or soldiering in war. Popular liberal women regularly participated 
in demonstrations (perhaps called riots by the authorities) in Cali, marching 
alongside men to rally support for Liberal Party candidates, to denounce 
abuses such as the aguardiente (cane liquor) monopoly, or to simply show 
the force of the Democratic Societies.65 They also had recourse to petitions, 
although most often, as with demonstrations or riots, they did so in concert 
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with popular liberal men. They could act in the public sphere independently 
of men as well, unlike poor Indian women, whose villages developed a vi-
sion of popular conservatism in order to protect their communal landhold-
ing and governance from liberal individualism. Popular liberal women’s 
relative independence from male control, compared to elite liberal women 
and popular conservative women, was the key factor that allowed them 
to enter the public sphere.
Just like elite conservative women, popular liberal women also par-
ticipated in warfare or revolts, not through provisioning male troops or 
establishing hospitals, but often as agents on the field of battle.66 In the early 
1850s, popular liberals went beyond knocking over fences, as we saw in the 
opening vignettes, to physically attacking conservatives and their haciendas. 
While men mostly participated in these invasions, women did as well, and 
some were arrested from time to time.67 During the 1854 civil war, women 
were held as spies against the Conservative government, accused of hiding 
soldiers in their houses, and after the war, they were arrested for joining 
bandit gangs (what conservatives called “liberal guerrillas”).68 Following 
the war, in one case eleven women abetted the jailbreak of liberal rebels 
(some identified as “black”) held by the Conservative state government.69 
In 1856, women were accused of being spies and smuggling arms to the 
popular, liberal, Afro–Colombian guerrilla leader Manuel María Victoria.70 
In the 1860–1863 civil war, a Liberal official in a region with much popular 
liberal support noted that “even the women want to take up arms in defense 
of the government.”71 Lower–class women ran a great risk, as conservatives 
treated poor prisoners, especially those of African descent, harshly. Liber-
als accused conservatives of forcing “poor black women,” charged with 
supporting popular liberal bands, to flee their homes by foot and “almost 
naked.”72 Worse, conservatives tortured “poor women” by hanging them 
in the air upside down by their ankles; such brutality “offended decency 
and morality.”73 
Perhaps during the sack of Cali in the 1876–1877 conflict, popular liberal 
women participated in public politics more dramatically than they ever had 
before. Conservatives seized Cali in a surprise uprising. Popular liberals 
hurried to retake the city, urged on by their female relations: “Women en-
couraged their husbands and brothers to the battle, mothers returned to the 
campaign their deserter children.”74 The women not only cheered on their 
compatriots, but also accompanied them, retaking the city for the liberals 
and participating in the looting of conservatives’ property.75 
While in some ways action during war was the most transgressive, 
popular liberal women most regularly claimed the public sphere in disputes 
over aguardiente; many poor women, especially those of African descent, 
often distilled and sold liquor. Taverns were an important site of subaltern 
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political activity, where men and women (especially the owners/barkeeps) 
discussed the events of the day and where visions of popular liberalism for 
both men and women developed.76 In the 1880s, a traveler noted the local 
pulpería (tavern), run by a woman, was a center of discussion and gossip.77 
Of course, taverns also gave women an important economic resource they 
sought to defend. Some “miserable women” petitioned the state to lower 
taxes on aguardiente, noting that only poor people engaged in such com-
merce, transporting “four or six bottles” to Cali, which only earned two or 
three pesos a month once peddled.78 Women alone signed this petition.
Disputes over aguardiente often led women into confrontations with 
authorities who hoped to tax or limit such entrepreneurship. In the village 
of La Cruz, “an immense mob of men and women” confronted the mayor 
who was trying to stop contraband liquor sales.79 While the official described 
a mob, another way of thinking about the activity of these poor men and 
women would be a demonstration, designed to convince more senior au-
thorities of the injustice of the local liquor monopoly.80 Many inhabitants 
of La Cruz defended the liquor producers as “wretched people,” trying 
to provide food for their children, and lamented the violent actions of the 
monopoly holders against “a poor and defenseless woman” who needed 
to sell liquor to survive.81 Similarly, an anonymous and threatening letter 
sent to the Conservative Party leader Sergio Arboleda, accused him of “tak-
ing away from poor women the only industry that they work in order to 
survive” when he tried to keep them from producing aguardiente as he held 
monopoly privileges. The writers warned, “It is better to steal 500,000 or 
more pesos from the government than to make war on women.”82 Popular 
liberal men and women often worked together to ensure the rights—be they 
to land, industry, or liberty—that they needed to survive.83 When it came 
time, however, to legally address the state and Liberal Party via petitions—as 
opposed to active demonstrations—women were almost always excluded 
since they were not citizens. It was popular liberal men in the Democratic 
Societies who demanded the state allow freedom to sell aguardiente, “the 
only industry of our women.”84 Elite liberals often accepted these appeals, 
since they philosophically opposed monopolies on liquor production and 
sale as a block on freedom of industry and since Conservatives traditionally 
had controlled said monopolies.
In spite of the various ways popular liberal women entered the politi-
cal sphere, they generally could not claim the vital mantle of citizenship, 
with a few notable exceptions. In a petition signed by eight women to 
the municipal government, although written by a man, the undersigned 
described themselves as “citizens [ciudadanas] of Colombia.” The women 
sold cane liquor off Cali’s main square and were protesting a new tax on 
their establishments, which they described as “very poor.” They argued 
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they should not be taxed as they had no capital beyond a few bottles of 
liquor and some tobacco, and because “they have suffered exile and a 
thousand persecutions for their loyalty to the noble cause of Liberty.”85 
While we cannot be sure of the social class or even political sympathies 
of the women, that they sold aguardiente (a profession dominated in Cali 
by poor women, especially those of African descent) and used a language 
designed to appeal to liberals, suggest they were popular liberals (male 
popular liberals—many of African descent—often defended the rights of 
women to sell liquor in their Democratic Societies, as we have seen). That 
the women could hire a lawyer or at least a scribe and that they rented 
rather prominent taverns, which, even if they were still barkeeps, suggest 
perhaps a slightly higher class. While their personal circumstances are 
unclear, these women’s efforts reveal how popular liberal women appropri-
ated the language of citizenship and liberty from the popular liberal men 
who drank in their bars. Certainly, as we have seen, popular liberal women 
were the most active participants in politics of all lower–class women in 
the region. It would have been tempting for them, especially given the 
sacrifices made by all popular liberals in the 1860–1863 civil war, to assert 
claims on the state due to their status as citizens. This strategy would not 
succeed in general—popular liberal women, unlike the same class of men, 
were not successful in claiming citizenship—although these eight women 
did succeed in having the liquor tax overturned!86 
A petition such as this was very rare. More common was one signed by 
poor women and men in Cali complaining about the city closing a stream 
they used for water. Their argument centers not on rights to the water but on 
a claim of custom going back to the founding of the city.87 By looking back 
to the past, and not asserting a political right as citizens, women could play 
a role denied them in the more common petitions from Cali’s male poor, 
which demanded action based on their rights as citizens and defenders of the 
Liberal Party. Other petitions from women focused on family relationships 
as a justification for their raised voices. A liberal paper printed a petition 
asking for pensions for “widows, sisters and mothers of Caucano soldiers, 
sacrificed in defense of the rights of the pueblo.”88 Popular liberal women, 
who, while excluded from joining the Democratic Societies, could petition 
the influential Democráticas to represent them—as did sixteen women who 
wrote to the president of Cali’s Democratic Society to ask him to intercede 
with the government on their behalf to secure the pensions owed to them 
since their husbands’ deaths in fighting for the Liberal Party in the past 
civil wars.89 These women’s political action had to be filtered, however, 
first through their relationship to liberal men (even if these men were dead) 
and through the male, if popular liberal, Democratic Society. The Liberal 
Party’s norms of political action were denied to them, as they were not 
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recognized as citizens. In general, all women of this time period had to 
channel their political actions and demands around issues of the general 
or familial good or through the discourses of the two political parties; we 
do not yet see openly feminist movements demanding women’s rights, 
which tended not to emerge in Latin America until the late nineteenth or 
early twentieth century.90
When female aguardiente producers petitioned the Liberal government 
without the support of popular liberal men in the Democratic Societies, 
their petition was soundly rejected by the state (although liberals had often 
supported similar petitions by men on behalf of women).91 Yet if their cause 
could be linked to popular liberal men, then they had a greater chance of 
success. A Liberal Party legislator demanded the repeal of a law taxing 
aguardiente, as it hurt “poor women,” especially since they bore “the honor-
able titles of mothers, sisters, and wives of those innumerable patriots who 
without any pretensions to personal gain came generously offering their 
blood on the sacred altar of Liberty and the Republic since 1810.”92 Women 
deserved recompense and political consideration due to the sacrifices made 
by their male relatives to the nation and especially to the Liberal Party. 
As a whole, the discourse of popular liberalism still envisioned a male 
political subject. Unlike elite conservatives who saw citizenship as based on 
social status and elite liberals who saw it as a right conditioned by rational-
ity, for male popular liberals service to the state and party created the good 
citizen, and women could rarely perform such services. Women legally were 
not citizens and therefore could not support the Party with votes. Possibly 
more important from the standpoint of popular liberalism, men shed their 
blood in wars against the rich, the conservative, and the otherwise bad 
citizens. Thus, the armed citizen became central to popular liberals as it 
gave them a new public identity that elite liberals recognized. Although 
women did play a role in wars, as we saw above, it was informal—they 
were not officially recognized as soldiers. By making the armed citizen so 
important to popular liberal political identity, men excluded women from 
the equality they themselves held so dear. That said, women ran the taverns 
where popular liberals met and talked politics, participated in protesting 
the aguardiente monopolies, and tore down fences in the ejidos alongside 
men. Nonetheless, they remained ideologically excluded from the liberal 
conception of politics and public life.
While popular liberal women’s relation with the ideas of citizenship 
limited their ultimate inclusion, they still managed a much more active 
role in the public sphere than some other female subalterns in the region, 
namely Indians. In the state archive, among hundreds of petitions sent 
by Indians, I only found one that included female signatories, concerning 
the return of three Indians jailed for perjury so they could continue their 
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work as teachers.93 Unlike popular liberal women who appear in public, in 
political space that is constantly in the historical record, Indian women are 
almost entirely absent. This is not to say that poor Indian women had no 
interest in politics or played no internal role in their communities’ political 
decisions—they certainly did and this familial or community political ac-
tion was no doubt vital. Yet they could not enter the public, political sphere 
since they had to act through their patriarchal villages.
Indian men employed a discourse of patriarchal authority to justify 
their role as leaders of their communities and citizens with a right to place 
demands on the state and nation.94 The construction of this patriarchal 
authority was based on two intertwined institutions: communal landhold-
ing (called resguardos) and the family. Indian officials, acting through the 
cabildos pequeños (councils chosen or elected by villages) of Túquerres and 
Ipiales, who represented all of the parcialidades (subdivisions of a resguardo 
usually representing a village) of the area, explicitly linked their resguardos 
with family life: “Communal property in our class is not prejudicial, but, 
rather, advantageous, because by conserving it, one also conserves our 
domestic relations, so that there never will appear among us the horrible 
monster of discord.”95 
Like the father of the individual family, the cabildo pequeño assumed 
patriarchal power over the “family” of the Indian community as a whole. A 
coalition of Indians explained the link between patriarchy and their resguar-
dos in a metaphor, “Our parcialidades, Honorable Deputies, are like a family 
that lives under one father.”96 Patriarchal power and political subjectivity 
were tied together. When the village of Guachavéz lost its status as a parish, 
and therefore its men lost leadership positions, the moral life of the village 
declined. Before their power was taken away, they noted that “the habits of 
disorder and libertinism, that are so common in places where the immediate 
weight of authority is not felt, became habits of obedience, all the inhabitants 
respecting the lowliest constable as much as the ultimate local authority.”97 
Male indigenous leaders used a language of domestic harmony through 
family life to both maintain consensus in villages with internal divisions 
and to claim political legitimacy in the public sphere.98 These men warned 
of the consequences if they lost their positions: “Without the authority of 
their governors, their town councilors [regidores], and their mayors [alcaldes] 
who incessantly and daily keep vigil over each house, each family, each 
individual Indian, they would lose themselves in their passions, and very 
soon, the customary links of union, order, and obedience broken, they would 
commit the most atrocious crimes.”99 Indigenous leaders linked their ability 
to control and regulate the moral and family life of their villages—to be, 
in other words, wise, powerful, and controlling fathers—to their rights to 
enter the political sphere as representatives of their communities.100 
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Yet did male popular liberals not share similar gendered visions of 
citizenship? Their elite allies certainly did. Popular liberals, however, did 
not imagine citizenship as constructed on the backs of the family. Popular 
liberals mentioned families much less in their discourse than did indigenous 
villagers. The good citizen did not have to be married and no patriarchal 
figure controlled their communities as in Indian villages. Instead, as we 
saw above, the armed citizen, serving the nation and party, earned citizen-
ship for popular liberals. This too was gendered, even if in a very distinct 
way that nevertheless excluded women. However, the lack of male family 
control, reflected in the distinct gendered visions of citizenship, did allow 
popular liberal women much more political space than their indigenous 
counterparts.
Popular liberal men seemed much less able to exercise control over 
popular liberal women than indigenous officers. Since most popular liber-
als did not own land (the commons were not individual property) or not 
enough to support a family, male land ownership did not lend itself to 
gender control. Also, some Afro–Colombian women had an independent 
economic resource in small–scale liquor production and sale, a resource 
popular liberal men were more than willing to defend. Unlike the con-
stant legal battles in which Indians engaged to protect their land, wherein 
women did not play a public role, popular liberal women did act with 
men to try to gain access to landholding, as we saw most powerfully with 
the destruction of fences in Cali’s ejido. They also signed petitions with 
men, again something largely unseen with Indians. In Cali, women not 
only destroyed fences to secure the commons, but entered the legal realm 
as well, signing demands for land in the ejido along with men.101 In the 
coastal region of San Juan, popular liberal women signed a petition with 
men claiming land rights; they described themselves as some “farmers 
desiring work, but without land” who had occupied some uncultivated 
land and now wanted title. Since popular liberal women were more likely 
than indigenous women to head households, and own or at least manage 
commons land, they would have been in a position to include themselves 
in petitions for land rights.102 
Finally, although the evidence is far from conclusive, on the city com-
mons that popular liberals did exploit, women seemed to control a good 
amount of the land, often heading their own households. In 1866, a partial 
census of Cali’s ejido listed 166 plots of land. Of these, single women (or 
at least no male relation listed) controlled seventy–four of the plots (44 
percent) and most women had children. Only twenty–six two–parent 
households were listed (16 percent). The remaining plots were occupied 
by single men or multiple users (40 percent). Other fragmentary evidence 
of the ejido does not show women controlling as much land, but they are 
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represented as heading farming households with no male present.103 These 
independent women faced intense pressure, including from elite families, 
especially conservatives, who claimed the women’s small farms were 
frequented by “drinkers and vagabonds,” and whose progeny should be 
removed to “honorable homes in order to prevent the corruption of these 
poor children.”104
While women in indigenous villages running their own farms were 
seen as a deviation from the ideal, their actions were usually the result of 
being widowed. Around Cali, female–headed households seemed to be 
much more the norm, and thus the family ideal, and the patriarchal male 
citizen seemed less powerful. Popular liberal women had much more in-
dependence than other subaltern women and correspondingly participated 
more overtly and regularly in the region’s politics.
Gender and Republican Political Culture
In spite of the formal exclusion of women from the political system, 
gender affected all aspects of nineteenth–century republican politics. This 
article has focused on how women of different social standings and ideologi-
cal camps managed or failed to enter the public, political sphere, in which 
they were supposed to play no direct role. Instead of assuming a unity of 
experience for women, the archive reveals that possibilities varied greatly 
depending on class, race, and whether one was liberal or conservative. 
Class was vitally important: Colombia, with such a weak middle class in 
the nineteenth century, demands that the scholar, as historian Paula Baker 
has suggested is necessary, move beyond a study of middle–class women. 
By doing so, however, one does not find “a distinct nineteenth–century 
women’s political culture” as Baker did for middle–class women in the 
United States, but rather a complex multiplicity of political cultures cre-
ated by women of different classes, races, and political parties, influencing 
and influenced by male political culture.105 Perhaps not surprisingly, elite 
women, whose husbands, brothers, and sons controlled the two political 
parties, had great advantages for entering the political realm; however, 
not all elite women were able to do so. Liberals’ vision of citizenship as 
the ultimate political identity prevented women from playing much of a 
role, since they were not citizens. Because conservatives saw citizenship as 
naturally closed to most people, including women, female participation in 
politics was more tolerable, perhaps even welcome, especially if oriented 
around traditional, colonial religious or charitable space women had long 
claimed as their own. Conservative women made impressive use of this 
political opening, often acting well ahead of male relatives in responding 
to the Liberal Party’s initiatives.
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It would seem that lower–class women, with so few resources, would 
have fewer public roles, but popular liberal women belied that assump-
tion by demonstrating, fighting, rioting, and petitioning alongside, or even 
independently of, men. Again, however, not all lower–class women had 
the same options. Indians’ distinct communities had specific gendered 
constructions of male political identity, which acted to limit women’s public 
participation in politics. Here party ideology seems less important. Indians 
mostly supported the Conservative Party in the 1850s, but by the 1860s 
were generally not tightly allied with either party. 
What seems key is that indigenous villages had an organizational struc-
ture and discursive ideology dominated by the male village officer. Popular 
liberals did not tend to control their own independent villages and thus, 
had no organizations that men dominated. Popular liberal women had more 
control over resources, be it land in the commons or liquor production, thus 
giving them some independence from patriarchal power—something elite 
liberal women lacked. Nevertheless, party ideology did play a role here, as 
popular liberals’ construction of the armed citizen limited the public role 
popular liberal women could play. 
Just as scholars can no longer understand nineteenth–century politi-
cal history without reference to subalterns, they can also no longer ignore 
gender or just state that women were excluded from politics. Likewise, 
we must not just leave the story as one of a simplistic all–encompassing 
patriarchy that underwrote the male political subject. Gender interacted 
with race, class, and partisan ideologies in complex and locally determined 
ways to both create male political subjects and open or close possibilities 
for women to forge political discourses and practices for themselves. 
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